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DIVERSITY OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING:
AFFIRMATIVE POLICY IN SEARCH OF AN AUTHOR*
When in 1965 the International Telephone and Telegraph Company
(ITT) announced its plans to acquire the American Broadcasting Company
(ABC),' it gave as its chief purpose a desire to "improve its image in the United
States."' 2 ITT wasted no time in attempting such "improvement." Evidence
adduced at Federal Communications Commission hearings revealed that during FCC consideration of the merger, ITT pressured reporters from the Associated Press, the United Press, and the New York Times to give favorable
coverage of the merger.3 Nevertheless, a majority of FCC Commissioners found
that the ABC-ITT merger would serve the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity," 4 and approved the transfer, relying in part upon the "solemn assurances" of the parties that ABC's independent editorial function would remain inviolable. 5 When the Justice Department subsequently took the merger
issue to court on antitrust grounds,6 ITT quietly dropped its plans for acquisition. 7
The importance of broadcast media is reflected in part by the fact that
8
ninety-seven per cent of American homes have at least one television set.
Broadcast media are primary sources of public information, and play an in9
creasingly active role in affecting public events and behavior. Because of the
vital role it plays, the communications industry's trend toward concentrated
ownership in recent decades has given rise to a continuing debate on ownership diversity.'
In the top fifty broadcast markets, eighty per cent of radio and television

*This note is in part the result of the author's participation in a media research project
undertaken by the Center for Governmental Responsibility, funded by the Josephine H.
McIntosh Foundation, Inc., Holland Law Center, Gainesville, Florida.
I. Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1965, at 32, col. I (merger plan announced); id., April 28, 1966, at
10, col. 3 (ABC stockholders approve merger).
2. Rucker, Let's Protect Our Dying First Freedom, in M. EMERY & T. SiMYTE , READINGS
IN MASS COMMUNICATION 363, 365 (1972).
3. ABC-ITT Merger, 9 F.C.C.2d 546, 573-74, 586-87 (1967).
4. Id. at 576. The Commission is required by statute to find that license transfers will
meet the "public interest" standard. 47 U.S.C. §310(b) (1970).
5. 9 F.C.C.2d at 576.
6. See 1967 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 315, A-13.
7. A lively account of the episode appears in M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, ANIERICA, INC. 26-29
(1971). See also Bradbury & Champy, Corporate Acquisition of Broadcast Facilities, 8 B.C. IND.
& Coat. L. REV. 903 (1967).
8. 1974 BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 68.
9. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMar'N ON CIVIL DISOIWERS (Kerner Report) 201-23 (1968) (effect of television coverage on localized riots).
10. E.g., Johnson & Hoak, Media Concentration:Some Observations on the United States'
Experience, 56 IowA L. REV. 267 (1970); Nixon & Ward, Trends in Newspaper Ownership
and Inter-media Competition, 38 JOURNALISM Q. 3 (1961); Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the
Newspapers, 82 HARV. L. REV. 319 (1968); Note, Diversification and the Public Interest: Administrative Responsibility of the FCC, 66 YALE L.J. 365 (1957); Note, Newspaper-Radio Joint
Ownership: Unblest Be the Tie That Binds, 59 YALE L.J. 1342 (1950).
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stations are newspaper or group-owned.:" Of the forty VHF-TV stations in the
top ten markets (serving over one-third of the nation's households), only one
station is owned independently of all other media. 12 Newspapers or broadcast
chains own over eighty per cent of all VHF television stations in the United
States. 3 At the same time, there has been a steady decline in the number of
daily newspapers, one-half of which are chain-owned. 14 Of a total of 1,750 daily
papers, over 1,300 of them enjoy monopolies in the cities they serve, and in
167 of the remaining cities two newspapers either have the same publisher or
share joint production arrangements. 5
The FCC plays a critical role in diversity policy. Because the number of
available broadcast channels is limited,16 the Commission controls entry into
the field. Broadcast licensees are not immune from antitrust liability." Since
the FCC issues licenses and must approve their transfer, the Commission bears
the primary responsibility for licensing in such a way as to promote competition.18 This responsibility is especially important in the communications industry because desirable first amendment goals depend on the vitality of the
commercial market.19 If one party dominates several media outlets, especially
in the same community, the opportunity for "the widest possible dissemination
21
20
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" is limited.
Overt examples of news management are rare, however, and journalists are

11. Hearings on Broadcast License Renewal Before the Subcomm. on Communications
and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,

set. 35, pt. 1, at 62 (1973) (testimony of Dean Burch, FCC Chairman) [hereinafter cited as
Hearingson License Renewal].

12. Id., pt. 2, at 1071 (testimony of Charles 0. Blaisdell).
13. In 1967 newspapers or broadcasting chains owned 81.3% of the country's VHF television stations. B. RucKER, THE FrosT FREEDoM 196 (1968). In 11 states all VHF stations were
owned by newspapers or chains, or both. Id. at 295, n.21.
14. E. EMERY, THE PRFss AND AMERiCA 621, table 3 (1972).
15. Hearings on S. 1312 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate

Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 63-65 (1957).
16. The scarcity of frequencies originally led to regulation of the airwaves. See text accompanying notes 57-59 infra. The "public domain" theory of airwaves is a later development, used primarily to sustain regulation of program content. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 378 (1969).
17. 47 U.S.C. §313(a) (1970).
18. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1959); United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 222-24 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
19. See Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (concurring opinion).
20. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944).
21. The concept of a "marketplace of ideas" was first expressed by Justice Holmes in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (dissenting opinion). If a true commercial
marketplace exists, the competition of ideas is thereby guaranteed. Id. at 630. This first
amendment rationale has been accepted by the Court. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974); Red Lion Bradcasting Co. v.FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944); Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). But see Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 2835-38 (1974) (marketplace of ideas may
be illusory but nevertheless first amendment guarantees protect publishers).
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by nature independent and sensitive to outside pressure.2 2 But media managers
are businessmen, not journalists,3 which sharply focuses the "public interest"
issue. A broadcaster may owe a positive duty to stockholders quite distinct
from first amendment responsibilities owed to the general public. 24 Thus,
mergers and acquisitions of broadcast properties are often prompted exclusively by the economic interests of the parties involved, without regard to
first amendment or other public interest considerations.25 Similarly, actions by
a station that may jeopardize the financial standing of the parent company will
be discouraged. If, to cite one example, the parent owner of a local station is
RKO General (a subsidiary of General Tire and Rubber Company), to what
extent will RKO's broadcast stations 26 report any failure of General's tires to

pass minimum safety standards? In 1969 two such tire models failed the
22. See, e.g., Blume & Lyons, The Monopoly Newspaper in a Local Election: The Toledo
Blade, 45 JouRNALISNI Q. 186 (1968). But see Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d
643, 655-56 (8th Cir. 1957) (news dissemination manipulated to monopolize advertising
market).
23. The first of the big chain owners, Frank Munsey, dreamed of a great cross-country
enterprise that would bring order into what he saw as the chaos of the newspaper business
at the end of the 19th century. Instead, he ended up single-handedly killing over six newspapers, including three in New York City. William Allen White's obituary of Munsey read:
"Frank A. Munsey contributed to the journalism of his day the talent of a meatpacker, the
morals of a money-changer, and the manners of an undertaker. He and his kind have about
succeeded in transforming a once-noble profession into an eight per cent security. May he
rest in trust!" E. EMERY, supra note 14, at 449-53.
24. In the broadcasting field, the first amendment responsibilities of licensees can be as
important as their first amendment rights. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
382 (1969) (public interest language of the Communications Act authorizes the FCC to require licensees to use their stations for discussion of public issues). Section 314(a) of the
Act, after stating the equal-time requirement for political candidates, notes: "Nothing in the
foregoing . . . shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, new interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news
events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues
of public importance." 47 U.S.C. §315(a) (1970). The public interest responsibilities of licensees
are relevant in the licensing process, where their performance is analyzed or compared to
that of competing applicants. The analysis and comparison center around the licensee's progranming, including its degree of responsiveness to community needs and interest as reflected in news, local, and public service programming. See Hearings on License Renewal,
supra note 11, at 109-16.
25. See M. 'MINTZ & J. COHEN, supra note 7, at 77-91. The trading practices of one owner,
George B. Storer, have been described as: "[The Storer group] were constantly selling and
buying stations, strengthening their line-up. Profits from the sale of stations were taxed at
the low capital-gains rate, whereas profits from station operation were taxed at a higher rate.
The buying and selling of stations could therefore be a quicker path to riches. The Storer
group seemed to think of its stations as 'properties' to be nursed for profitable sale." 2
E. BARNOUW,

TuE

GOLDEN

¥EB: A HISTORY OF BROAICASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 220 (1965),

quoted in Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED. Cost. B.J. 1, 3
(1974).
26. In 1969 RKO owned the maximum allowable number of broadcast stations: in Los
Angeles, New York, Boston, and Detroit it had AM-FM-TV combinations; in Memphis TV
and AM, and in Hartford, Conn. a TV station. Additionally, RKO owned 99 cable TV
systems, 121 movie theaters, I newspaper, and 2 common carrier systems. Hearings on
License Renewal, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 1071.
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National Highway Safety Bureau standards; at the same time General Tire and
RKO General were defendants in a Justice Department antitrust suit, accused
of conspiring to coerce dealers into buying products and services, including
advertising time on RKO stations.2 The FCC that year routinely approved
the license renewals, without hearings, of all but one of RKO's six California
radio and TV stations.

28

Current FCC licensing procedures do little to assure diversity. Where
private parties assign their licenses (the usual mode of acquisition), media or
corporate concentration is rarely an issue because proposed licensees are subject to only minimal scrutiny 29 In comparative renewal proceedingss 0 involving competing applicants, the doctrine announced over twenty years ago in
Hearst Radio, Inc.31 permits renewal of incumbents with mediocre programming records regardless of the licensee's media affiliations.32 There has been
only one significant example of divestiture by FCC order in the industry's
4
history,33 and refusals to renew broadcast licenses are extremely rare.
It is easy to conclude, as many commentators have, that the FCC is simply
dominated by the industry it is supposed to regulate.3 5 In reality, however, the
lack of affirmative action in this area is substantially due to confusion regarding the FCC's role as a regulatory agency. The Commission is empowered by
the Communications Act of 1934 to issue licenses only when the "public in-

27. The suit was filed, in 1967 in Cleveland. See 1967 BNA ANrrrusr & TRADE REG. REP.
No. 295, A-1. A consent decree was obtained Aug. 24, 1970, after the FCC had approved the
license renewals. 1970 BNA ANTrrRusr & TRADE REG. Ry-'. No. 476, A-8.
28. RKO General, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 989 (1969). The sixth RKO California station,
WHJ-TV, had been challenged by a competing applicant in 1966 and was still in hearing.
29. Proposed transferees are required by statute to be treated as if they were the sole
-applicants for a license, notwithstanding that there may be interested parties with superior
qualifications. 47 U.S.C..§510(b) (1970). See text accompanying notes 116-119 infra.
30. See generally for discussion of the comparative criteria: Anthony, Toward Simplicity
and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. RFv. 1 (1971);
Friendly, The Federal £dministrative Agencies: The Need for a Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV.L. Rav. 1055, 1055-72 (1962).
31. 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951); accord, Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963).
32. In Hearst, the FCC had to choose between an incumbent with a mediocre programming record and a highly qualified newcomer. Although the Commission found the
newcomer superior on major comparative criteria, including the newcomer's lack of affiliation compared with the incumbent's control of vast media resources, the FCC renewed
because of the "clear advantage of continuing the established party." Id. at 1182.
33. In 1943 the FCC ordered NBC, which owned two radio networks, to divest itself of
one of them. Radio Corp. of America, 10 F.C.C. 212, 218 (1943). The new network became
the American Broadcasting Corp. (ABC).
34. Grounds for refusal to renew a broadcast license are usually quite extreme: misrepresentation to the Commission, falsification of station logs, or participation in unlawful
lotteries. See, e.g., FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946); United States Broadcasting
Corp., 2 F.C.C. 208 (1955); Eleven Ten Broadcasting Corp., 22 P 8:F RADio REG. 699 (1961).
The renewal process is descried in W. JoNas, RIcuLATEa INDusMrEs 1067-69 (1967).
35. See, e.g., Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1967);
M. MiNZ & J. CorN, supra note 7, at 76-123; Hearings on License Renewal, supra note 11, at
147 (testimony of FCC Comm'r Nicholas Johnson); Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 Go. L.J. 869, 873-85 (1971).
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terest, convenience, or necessity" will be served thereby.36 Faced with this
vague mandate, the FCC has been left to develop the exact meaning of "public
interest" in the diversity context. That development has been variously tentative37 and fumbling38 and is marked by the FCC's reliance on various groups
that attempt to influence regulatory policy.39 The purpose of this note is to
examine the nature of the FCC's role as a regulatory agency, focusing on the
evolution of diversity policy, and to analyze functionally the institutional
groups that influence that policy. Reference will be made to the probable effects of broadcast license renewal legislation now before Congress 0 and the
FCC's recently terminated multiple ownership rulemaking in Docket No.
18110.41
36. 47 U.S.C. §303 (1970).
37. E.g., Interim Policy Concerning Acquisition of Broadcast Stations, 5 P & F RADIO REG.
2D 271 (1965), 6 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 66 (1965). The policy proposed to limit group acquisitions of VHF-TV stations in the top fifty markets to two. The order was rescinded in 1968
after it was found that (1) the policy unduly favored entrenched incumbents who already
owned more than two stations because the policy operated prospectively only and did not
require divestiture; (2) it discouraged capital ventures; and (3) it stagnated the economic
atmosphere because few prospective buyers did not already own two stations in the top
fifty markets. With no growth incentive, buying by others was discouraged. See Levin, Competition, Diversity, and the Television Group Ownership Rule, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 814-18
(1970).
38. E.g., the Commission's Uniform Policy on Law Violations, issued in 1951, which
stated that the FCC would consider violations of the antitrust laws to the extent that they
reflect upon the applicant's qualifications to serve as a licensee. For a descripion of how the
Commission almost immediately came to approve a license transfer to a party that had 198
antitrust actions pending against it, see Perry, Current Antitrust Problems in Broadcasting,
27 OHo ST. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1966).
39. Aside from the generality of the Communications Act, it has been suggested that, as
with other regulatory agencies, a major problem with the FCC in developing affirmative
policy is the lack of quality personnel. See Elliott, The Regulators, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1974,
at 1, col. 1 (FCC Commissioner Charlotte Reid's lack of apparent qualifications). This problem is perpetuated by the exodus from agencies to lucrative private employment. As one
commentator noted, the trend is for "the mature administrative agency [to] drift into the
hands of people, able and devoted indeed, but of the second level of competence or initiative. Often they will be men who find congenial the routine security of office and the reliable deference of the small group of important businessmen and counsel who regularly
appear before them." Schwariz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of JudicialResponsibility, 67 HARV. L. REv. 474, 475 (1954).
40. Over 100 bills to amend the Communications Act were submitted to the 93d Congress. The two most important are reproduced in 42 GEo. WASH. L. RFv. 67 (1973), and
discussed in Goldberg, A Proposal To Deregulate Broadcast Programming, id. at 73; Kramer,
An Argument for Maintainingthe Current FCC Controls, id. at 93.
A compromise bill, H.R. 12993, passed the House on May 1, 1974, 120 CONG. REc. H3413-33
(daily ed. May 1, 1974), and the Senate passed a substitute measure on Oct. 8, 1974, 120
CONG. REC. S18498-523 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974). H.R. 12993 died at the end of the session
because Harley 0. Staggers, Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, refused to send the bill to conference. 32 CONG. Q. 3437 (1974).
Nevertheless, a number of identical or substantially similar bills were introduced early
in the Ist session of the 94th Congress, and will be considered in that session. See, e.g., H.R.
243, H.R. 448, H.R. 545, H.R. 669, H.R. 972, H.R. 1525, H.R. 1737, H.R. 1778, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975).
41. Second Report and Order, Docket No. 18110, 32 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 954 (1975).
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CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION: THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF

1934

In the early days of the New Deal, Congress passed a number of statutes
delegating, either to the Executive or to various administrative agencies, an
array of powers cast in very general terms. 42 In the act creating the National

Recovery Administration, 3 for instance, the Executive was given almost uncontrolled discretion to formulate regulations for industry. The Act's only
limitations were that such measures should "rehabilitate industry," "relieve
unemployment," "eliminate unfair trade practices," and otherwise "provide
44
for the general welfare."
The Communications Act of 1934, 45 which created the FCC, generously
delegated the power to license broadcasters, including original license grants46
and their sale,47 renewal, 4 and revocation. 49 The standard for the use of this

power is that all licensing be in the "public interest." 50 Two provisions of the
Act relate to diversity. Section 313 declares that antitrust laws are applicable
to broadcasters and that parties whose licenses have been revoked by a court
in an antitrust action are thereafter to be denied a license. 51 Section 314 proscribes the purchase or other acquisition of broadcast facilities if "the purpose
and/or the effect thereof may be to substantially lessen competition or to restrain commerce ....
,,52 The FCC's authority to promulgate and enforce
diversity ownership policy must be explored against this statutory backdrop.
Narrow Versus Broad Legislative Delegation
Two schools of thought have developed concerning the appropriate scope
of power granted by Congress to regulatory agencies. Ernst Freund summarized
one of these in 1928 when he wrote: "With regard to major matters the appropriate sphere of delegated authority is where there are no controverted is-

42. See F. BLACHLEY & M. OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION 21-27
(1934). The Roosevelt Administration sought to solve the country's depression-induced problems by vesting regulatory agencies with the power to act decisively. See generally 2
A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE ACE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL (1964).

43. National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1938).
44. See Note, Some Legal Aspects of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 47 HARv. L.

Rxv. 85, 94-95 (1933).
45. 47 U.S.C. §§151 et seq. (1970).
46. Id. §307(a).
47. Id. §310(b).
48. Id. §307(d).
49. Id.
50. "Public interest" was first held to be an adequate standard in a case interpreting the
Interstate Commerce Act, Avent v. .Jnited States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924). The "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" standard was upheld in a construction of the Radio Act of 1927.
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933). accord, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (Communications
Act of 1934).
51. 47 U.S.C. §313 (1970). See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334
(1959) (doctrine of primary jurisdiction not applicable to broadcasting).
52. 47 U.S.C. §314 (1970).
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sues of policy or of opinion."53 "Hence," he continued, "direct statutory regulation may be preferred, if the subject matter . . . has a strong public ap-

peal ...."54 Freund's narrow-delegation approach would favor detailed statutory definition of prohibited media combinations, to avoid the possibility of
regulatory abuse. Such abuse, in his view, is inherent wherever Congress
delegates discretionary power. 55
In theory, there is no reason why Congress cannot prescribe detailed provisions regarding the ownership of media properties; the complexity of the tax
and social security codes is proof that Congress can legislate with great
specificity when it considers a matter sufficiently important 56 Two major factors have combined to produce the generality of the Communications Act:
historical accident and congressional preference for the theory of broad legislative delegation.
The specific ill that the Communications Act and its predecessor, the Radio
Act of 1927, 57 were designed to remedy was the chaos caused by broadcasters'
interference with one another in the limited radio spectrum.55 The assignment
of frequencies and other technical aspects of broadcast regulation has from the
beginning constituted a major part of the agency's work.5 9 Once the basic sorting out of frequencies had been accomplished, however, the Commission faced
the task of defining the "public interest" by developing policy to deal with the
myriad nontechnical aspects of regulation.
The FCC received little guidance in this task from Congress. The legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress never addressed itself specifically
to problems in the industry other than the proper allocation of channels. 60
There were fears that a broadcaster might abuse his exclusive broadcast

53.

E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS

54.

Id.

AND PROPERTY

218 (1928).

55. See 47 U.S.C. §303(r) (1970) (statutory authority to promulgate rules and regulations).
56. See also the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §5(2)(c) (1970), which mandates that
the ICC consider railroad mergers in light of the following considerations: "(I) The effect

...upon adequate transportation service to the public; (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to include, other railroads in the territory involved in the
proposed transaction; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction;
and (4) the interest of the carrier employees affected."
57. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, §§I et seq., 44 Stat. 1162 (now Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. §§151 et seq.).

58. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States 319 U.S. 190, 210-13 (1943).
59. There are many who believe that the FCC's role should be limited to that of "traffic
policeman," particularly those who object to FCC regulation of program content. E.g., 1973
ANNUAL

CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON

ADVOCACY

IN THE UNITED

STATES, FINAL

REPORT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE NEWS MEDIA recommendations 7-9 and text, at 21-26

[hereinafter cited as WARREN CONFERENCE REPORT]; Goldberg, A Proposal To Deregulate
Broadcast Programming,42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 73 (1973); Robinson, The FCC and the First
Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV.
67, 97-150 (1967) (FCC Commissioner Glen Robinson).

60. See, e.g., 68

CONG.

REC. 2556-80, 2869-82, 3025-39, 3117-24, 4109-55 (1926-1927) (Radio

Act of 1927); 67 CONG. REc. 5473-504, 5555-86, 5645-47, 12335-59, 12497-508 (1926) (Radio Act

of 1927).
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franchise by denying access to disfavored politicians. 61 On the whole, however,
there was no specific elaboration of problem areas of regulation, and. the
phrase "public interest" was repeatedly used without definition. 62 'Thus, the
statutory history reveals that Congress had little idea of the precise nature of
the authority it was delegating.
That Congress should have legislated so generally in this area is not surprising, for, as the Supreme Court stated in National Broadcasting,Co. v.
United States, 63 "Congress was acting in a field which was both new and dynamic."8' 4 Unlike the railroad and securities industries, which were relatively
well developed at the time federal regulation was asserted over them, the radio
industry was in its infancy in 1927.65 Accordingly, Congress enacted provisions
requiring all broadcasters to be licensed by the Commission, providing the
framework for issuing, renewing and revoking those licenses, and delegating
the detail of administration to the FCC.
In his 1938 lectures on administrative law, 6 Dean Landis described an aggressive, idealistic model of the administrative agency under this broad definition of authority.6 The administrative agency, in his view, embodied -the best
of executive, judicial, and legislative functions,-8 and was a response to congressional and judicial inadequacies in public regulation.9 Congress- has
neither the expertise nor the time to spare for the details of everyday administration.70 Partisan conflicts, which occur regularly on sensitive issues, further
61. See 76 CoNG. RYc. 3768, 5038 (1933); 68 CONG. REc. 2589 (1927); 67 CONG, REc.
12501-03 (1926); Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, 186 F.2d 1, 2-5 (3d Cir. 1950). The
product of these fears was the "equal time" provision for political candidates. See 47 C.F.R.
§§73.123, .300, .598, .679 (1973) (all identical). The equal time regulations were sustained
against first amendment attack in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
62. E.g., 68 CoNG. Ruc. 3027-29 (1927) (remarks of Sen. Dill, floor manager of the Radio
Act of 1927).

63. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
64.
65.

Id. at 219.

See W. JONES, supra note 34, at 1019-28 (1967).

66. J. LANDIs, TIEADMINISTRATIVE

PRO

S

(19-38).

67., Id. -at 18-19.
68. Originally, confusion was generated by the doctrine of separation of powers concerning whether Congress could constitutionally delegate legislative power. The case of
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), stated: "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power
. . . is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government ordained by the constitution." Id. at 692. However, congressional delegation to an independent agency has never been held invalid on this basis. See K. DAvis, 1
AIMINSrsATIVE LAwv TEAnTISz 64-74, 76-81 (1958).
69. J. LANDIS, supra note 66, at 46. Not everyone shared Dean Landis' enthusiasm. The
American Bar Association, for instance, actively opposed the establishment of administrative
agencies, beginning in 1933. In 1940 the ABA sponsored the Walter-Logan bill, which in
Landis! words would have "cut off herez foot and there a head, leaving broken and bleeding
the processes of administrative law." Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 53 I-Luv.
L. Rv. 1077, 1102 (1940). An account of the interplay between proponents and opponents
of the developing system of administrative law, which culminated in passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, appears in K. DAvis, supra note 68, at 27-30.
70. In support of this conclusion compare the legislativ.e output of administrative
agencies with that of Congress. The Code of Federal Regulations is considerably larger than
the United States Code, and the Federal Register is similarly larger than the Statutes at Large.
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render congressional supervision unwieldy. A general delegation of power
ideally allows Congress to outline a broad social policy and at the same time to
avoid the inflexibility of detailed legislative enactments. Such legislation also
permits the agency to respond to changing conditions, unforeseen at the time
of enactment. For the FCC, this means that policy can be promulgated or
amended through the hearing process, with the advice of its bureaus, without
resort to the cumbersome legislative process.
In terms of diversity regulation, the FCC unfortunately has not lived up to
the promise of Landis' broad delegation model. The most significant action
taken by the FCC to limit concentrated ownership has been its adoption of
multiple ownership rules."' At present, the rules prohibit the licensing of a
party who owns an identical broadcast facility in the same primary service
area.7 2 The rules also discourage undue concentration of control in any single
individual or corporation. Although a finding of such undue concentration depends on "the facts in each case," there is a conclusive presumption of undue
media concentration where the owner seeks more than seven AM, FM, or TV
73
stations.
Multiple ownership rules tend to become the only measure of concentration
because inquiry into a proposed licensee's ownership qualifications generally
74
stops at the ascertainment of the number of stations owned by that party.
Notwithstanding the rules' caveats that concentration is to be determined by
the facts in each case, the Commission rarely inquires whether the acquisition
where a proposed licensee owns
will result in undue regional concentration
72
fewer than seven stations of the type sought.
The FCC's duopoly rules7 6 limit a single owner to no more than one AM,
FM, or TV station in the same market. Until 1970 the rules applied only to
intra-media ownership, thus permitting common control of an AM, FM, and
TV station in the same area. The 1970 "one-to-a-customer" rule 77 proposed to
limit all future broadcast acquisitions to only one AM, FM, or TV facility per
licensee. The new rule would not disturb existing combinations, although if a
combination owner were to transfer one license he could not thereafter acquire
another of the same type.78 The "one-to-a-customer" rule suffered immediate

71. 47 C.F.R. §§73.35 [AM]. .240 [FM], .636 [TV] (1973). See generally Howard, supra
note 25.
72. Id. §§73.35(a), .240(a)(1), .636(a)(1) (1973).
73. Id. §§73.35(b), .240(a)(2), .636(a)(2) (1973). Until recently, ownership of more than the
maximum number was considered undue concentration per se and was absolutely prohibited.
However, the Commission seems to have converted the absolute prohibition into a presumption. See Twin States Broadcasting Co., 39 F.C.C.2d 835 (1973).
74. See Beaumont Broadcasting Corp., 17 F.C.C.2d 577, 581-82 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
75. See, e.g., Muskegon Heights Broadcasting Co., 39 F.C.C.2d 475 (1973); Assignment of
Station WNUL, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 77 (1971).
76. 47 C.F.R. §§73.35(a) [AMI, .240(a)(1) [FM], .636(a)(1) [TV] (1973).
77. First Report g- Order, Docket No. 18110, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970); see 47 C.F.R. §§73.35,
.240, .636 (1971).
78. 22 F.C.C.2d at 309.
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erosion, however. In 1971 the FCC excepted UHF-TV facilities, 9 and later
the same year the Commission announced that AM-FM combinations would
no longer be prohibited.80
Newspaper-BroadcastingCross-Ownership:Docket No. 18110
In 1970 the FCC proposed a rule that would reduce the common ownership, operation, or control of daily newspapers and broadcasting stations in the
same market. 8' The rule would have required divestiture within five years of
commonly-owned newspaper or broadcast properties.8 2
The Commission released its findings and conclusions on January 31,
1975,83 after four years of comments, replies, studies, staff reports, and oral
arguments. 4 The Commission endorsed the idea that promoting diversity by
prohibiting common ownership of local newspapers and broadcast facilities8 5
is in the public interest. Finding, however, that divestiture of existing combinations would result in "losses or diminution of service to the public," the
Commission ordered that the rule would apply to require separation of commonly-owned facilities only in communities where the only daily newspaper
owned the only raido or television station.8 6 Otherwise, the rule will operate
prospectively only.
The effectiveness of the new rules in reducing concentrated ownership is
purely illusory. As Commissioner Robinson noted in dissent to the Second Report and Order:
In most of the markets involving newspaper-television station ownerships the stations have been commonly owned since the time of original
license. Very few of the common ownerships that have been created have
been dissolved by transfer of control or assignment of license ....
[T]he
very stability of ownership proves the point that we cannot realistically
8
rely on future transfers to dissipate the concentration of ownership. 7
Thus, the grandiose statement of policy embodied in the Second Report and
Order is rendered nugatory by the FCC's failure to require divestiture in ex79. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 36 Fed. Reg.
4288 (1971).
80. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Docket No. 18110, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971).
81. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. 18110, 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970).

82. Id. at 346.
83. Second Report and Order, Docket No. 18110, 32 P &F RADio REG. 21 954 (1975).
84. See id. at 1032-42 (apps. C-G).
85. The Commission defined "daily newspaper" as one published four or more times a

week. Id. at 984, n.21. For the geographic market within which newspapers and broadcast
stations are deemed co-located, the Commission adopted the Grade A service contours of
television stations and the service area counterparts for radio. Id. at 984.

86. Id. at 986-94.
87. Id. at 1024 (dissenting opinion). Commissioner Robinson also pointed out that the
number of newspaper applications for new licenses over the last decade has been negligible.
Id. at 1025. His argument gains additional force due to the fact that the rule itself will operate to chill future sales or transfers of newspaper-owned licenses, See note 37 supra (negative effect of the group ownership rules).
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isting combinations. The irony of the Commission's application of the rule is
emphasized by the divestiture requirement imposed on the handful of owners
who enjoy pure media monopolies in their respective markets.8s The stations
and newspapers in these localities are likely to be small, marginal operations
where independent ownership may not be possible. The Commission emphasized this fact by anticipating waiver requests and exempting two stations
from divestiture by its own motion.8 9
Broad delegation theory, as the Supreme Court has recognized, may help to
define the quality and limits of the power granted the FCC. 90 But the lack of
clearly articulated, anticipatory policy planning exemplified by the Commission's vacillation in the one-to-a-customer and newspaper cross-ownership rulemakings indicates that the FCC has failed to take advantage of the statute's
delegation in regulating ownership.
The Jaffe Model
Professor Louis Jaffe has postulated an essentially passive model of the
FCC's administrative process, rejecting both the narrow and broad-delegation
models. 91 In his view, the FCC has adequately performed "what Congress in88. Divestiture will be required within five years in seven cities where the only daily
newspaper is co-owned with the only local television station: Anniston, Ala.; Albany, Ga.;
Mason City, Iowa; Meridian, Miss.; Watertown, N.Y.; Texarkana, Tex.; and Bluefield, W. Va.
32 P. & F RADIO REG. 2D 1040 (app. D).
89. Id. at 994-96. The question of waiver will doubtless also arise in future transactions
that would otherwise violate the cross-ownership rules. For instance, Joe L. Allbritton, the
tentative purchaser of the Washington Star Comunications Co., has asked for a waiver of the
rule on the grounds that the company's local TV operation subsidizes the otherwise unprofitable daily newspaper, The Washington Star-News. 33 CONG. Q. 230 (1975). Even assuming that the subsidy allegations are true, a waiver of the rules is not a desirable remedy.
The capital realized from sale of the broadcast property can easily be reinvested to yield the
same subsidy provided by the station. Second, it may be more appropriate to devote broadcast profits to subsidize normally unremunerative broadcast services. Third, continued crossownership of newspapers and broadcast station may pose the very first amendment problems
that the rule was designed to avoid. Cf. S. UNGER, THE PAPERS AND ThE PAPERS 139-47 (1972)
(Washington Post's hesitation in publishing Pentagon Papers for fear the paper might lose
its station licenses).
If waiver is to be considered, the appropriate standard should be the "failing company"
antitrust doctrine, which would require (1) that the resources of the newspaper are "so
depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote" that the paper faces "the grave
probability of a business failure"; and (2) that there be no prospective purchaser for the
paper. See Intenational Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930). See also Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1969).
90. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1969) (rulemaking
power broad enough to cover all aspects of the public interest); United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (although a new communications development, intent of
Congress broad enough to include CATV); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (FCC mandate "not niggardly, but expansive").
91. See generally Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe. Ideal Administration]; Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1693 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe, WHDH];
Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. Rav.
1105 (1954).
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tended and still intends it to do," and has occasionally "pushed into ventures

somewhat beyond congressional expectations.."92 Professor Jaffe disposes of
the Freund ideal of detailed legislative delegation 3 by concluding that it
would make modern administration impossible. Paradoxically, however, he
also concludes that because Congress could have enacted detailed legislation,
its failure to do so limits FCC action to the few areas in compelling need of
regulation. Drawing on the legislative history of the Communications Act,94
Professor Jaffe finds that Congress simply did not intend for the FCC to
handle any but the most severe problems outside of technical regulation. 9
The FCC's reluctance to define or supervise concentrated ownership is thus
fully justified, in his view, by congressional acquiescence in the broadcast industry's development. Negative congressional reaction to FCC policy overtures
are cited in support of this conclusion96
Reliance on the legislative history of the Communications, Act for this
proposition is unjustified. Cross-ownership of radio stations did not become a
factor until the late 1930's when newspapers, realizing they could not beat the
new medium in the competition for advertising, decided instead to join them.97
At that point the merger of newspaper and broadcast interests began in
earnest, so that by 1941 the FCC was fearful that newspapers would enjoy
nationwide control of the radio industry. 9
A second reason for lack of congressional concern over diversity of ownership was that broadcasting had just begun its development. In 1935 there were
only 605 AM radio stations; television and FM radio did not become commercially feasible until after 1940.19 Because these radio stations tended to
cluster around major population centers, resulting in highly diversified ownership structures in major markets, there was little perception of the potential
for single-market domination. 100
Professor Jaffe finds the problem of defining the "public interest" standard
92. Jaffe, Ideal Administration,supra note 91, at 1191 (emphasis in original).
93. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
94. See notes 60-62 supra.
95. Jaffe, Ideal Administration,supra note 91, at 1191-95.
96. Id. at 1195.
97. During the Depression newspaper advertising fell 45%, while radio advertising
doubled. For a time, newspapers attempted to stifle the new medium by such means as
withholding news items in advance of publication so that radio stations could not broadcast
the news. Thus, in 1933 the Associated Press membership voted not to furnish, wire service
to radio networks. The collapse of this effort came in 1935 when newspapers began to buy
into the radio industry. See E. EMERY, supra note 14, at 588-96, 618-20.
98. In hearings held that year it was found that newspapers owned 30% of AM stations,
were heavily interested in newly-developed FM stations, and had applied for nearly half of
the first 60 television licenses. Id. at 609. Similar fears were later voiced about radio dominance of the emerging television industry. See generally Weaver & Cooley, Competition in
the Broadcasting of Ideas and Entertainment-Shall

Radio Take Over Television?, 101 U.

PA. L. REv. 721 (1953).
99. See U.S. DEP'T or ComaMc:E, 1972 STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNrrED STATES 498,
table 806 (1973).
100. In 1927 Chicago had 40 radio stations within a 25-mile radius, New York had 38,
and Philadelphia and San Francisco had 22 each. W. JONES, supra note 34, at 1025.
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insurmountable. 1° 1 Instead., he posits a political model in which the FCC responds, in its rulemaking, to various constituencies, which include the industry,
Congress, and the Executive.10 2 Critics of the FCC, he points out, are guilty of
personally defining the Commission's broad delegation and then condemning it
for acting contrary to that definition.10 3
In the diversity context, Professor Jaffe's assertion that a passive Commission role is the only legally appropriate one seems unfounded. Congress
manifested its desire that competition be maximized in the communications
industry in vague terms; but with the Sherman and Clayton Acts it has indicated a firm desire that competition shall be a fundamental national policy.104 Although the FCC does not have the power to adjudicate antitrust issues as such, 10 the Supreme Court has held that antitrust considerations alone
might keep the "public interest" standard from being met. 06 A clear example
is when the publisher of the sole newspaper in an area applies for a license for
the only available radio and television facilities. 07 Such consideration of antitrust principles inevitably requires the evolution of consistent policy if the
Commission is to grant licenses fairly in the public interest.
Professor Jaffe's fundamental observation that the FCC has become a
passive regulator remains vital, however, regardless of his belief in the appropriateness of this role. Because the "public interest" standard is not selfexecuting, an intense political process takes place in and around the agency
in which various interest groups attempt to produce desired results by proposing self-serving definitions of the "public interest."108 To the extent that the
Commission is available to all interested parties, the process is a healthy one,
for ultimately the "public interest" may mean no more than the balancing of
all legitimate competing interests. In this respect regulation of ownership
diversity has been distorted at the FCC, because of the disparity of access to
the administrative process. 0 9
101. In fairness to Professor Jaffe it should be pointed out that FCC Commissioners
themselves seem unable to arrive at a satisfactory general definition. Compare Hearings on
License Renewal, supra note 11, at 61-68 (testimony of Dean Burch, FCC Chairman), with
Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869 (1971) (former FCC Com-

missioner Nicholas Johnson).
102. Jaffe, Ideal Administration,supra note 91, at 1188-90.
103. Apparently Professor Jaffe is not above such criticism himself. See generally Jaffe,
WHDH, supra note 91.
104. See Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 759 (1973) (antitrust law represents
fundamental national policy in favor of competition). The language of the Sherman Act is
significant in this respect, for the essential prohibition of trade restraints and monopolies is
stated in no more than 75 words. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1970). Congress thus eschewed detailed
legislation in favor of a mandate to federal courts to develop a common law of antitrust. See
P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 22-24 (1967).
105. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 346 (1959).
106. Id. at 351-52. See also Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33-34 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
107. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351-52 (1959).
108.
109.

See Jaffe, Ideal Administration, supra note 91, at 1187.
See CENTER FOR STUDY OF REsPONSIvE LAW, WORKING

ON

THE

SYSTEM

259-64

(J. Michael ed. 1974).
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The "public interest, convenience, or necessity" standard is obviously broad
enough to cover a variety of regulatory contingencies. Congress, said the
Supreme Court in National BroadcastingCo. v. United States:
[Dlid not frustrate the purposes for which the Communications Act of
1934 was brought into being by attempting an itemized catalogue of the
specific manifestations of... general problems.... That would have
stereotyped the powers of the Commission to specific details in regulating a field of enterprise the dominant characteristic of which was the
rapid pace of its unfolding .... 110
The FCC can encourage diversity by considering antitrust and concentration
of control issues in license proceedings and by the use of the rulemaking
authority."" Whether, and how, the Commission acts in these contexts is proportional in diversity regulation to the pressure exerted from constituent
groups.
Congress
As noted above, the inference to be drawn from antitrust law and various
provisions of the Communications Act is that Congress intended broadcasting
to be a field of free competition." 2 The Supreme Court has endorsed this
view."x3 But mere inference is not helpful when the Commission attempts to
promulgate policy limiting newspaper 1 4 or conglomerate licensing. 1 5
On occasion, Congress has spoken clearly to FCC diversity policy. In 1945
the Commission announced that it would limit the free transfer of licenses by
requiring proposed buyers to enter a comparative proceeding with whoever
chose to offer the seller similar terms." 6 The FCC found the rule unworkable
and abandoned it."'1 Nevertheless, Congress passed the McFarland Act in
1952,1l l insuring that transferees would be considered as if they were the sole
applicants. The effect of the Act is to minimize scrutiny of the buyer's media
affiliations. With no one to whom he can be compared, a buyer's holdings must

110. 319 US. 190, 219 (1943).
111. Section 303(r) of the Communications Act enables the Commission to make "such
rules and regulations ... as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." 47
U.S.C. §303(r) (1970). See 47 C.F.R. §§1.401 et seq. (1973) (rulemaking procedure).
112. See notes 104-107 supra and accompanying text.
113. E.g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
114. See notes 81-89 supra and accompanying text.
115. The Commission began an inquiry into conglomerate ownership in 1969; apparently
the study has become dormant. See Inquiry Into the Ownership of Broadcast Stations by
Persons or Entities with Other Business Interests, Docket No. 18449, 16 F.C.C.2d 436 (1969).
116. Powel Crosley, Jr. (AVCO case), 11 F.C.C. 2, 26-28 (1945).
117. See Statement of the Commission, 17 U.S.L.W. 2412 (March 8, 1949).
118. 66 Stat. 716 (1952), 47 U.S.C. §310(b) (1970).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/8

14

Watkins: Diversity Ownership in Broadcasting: Affirmative Policy in Search
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REV'IEW

[Vol. XxvII

be extensive for the FCC to find the transfer not in the "public interest, neces'
sity, or convenience. 1119
In most cases, however, congressional policy expressions take the form of
committee reports and bills that fail to pass. 120 The latter category includes
bills that would prohibit the FCC from discriminating against owners of other
mass media in the license process; 12' 1 prevent an applicant's newspaper ownership from being a discrediting factor;122 and command that the renewal process consider only the incumbent's programming record without reference to
diversity.123 On the average, unenacted bills and committee reports favor the
security of existing licensees, without regard to the social cost of vesting owners with perpetual franchises. But the FCC should not have to divine congressional policy by "averaging out" the attitudes of individual congressmen.
Legislation is introduced in reaction to affirmative steps on the FCC's part to
encourage diversity. Some reaction is to be expected, but the FCC should not
be swayed by the minority views expressed in unsuccessful legislative enactments. The Commission might be thought undemocratic in the institutional
sense; its members are not elected, its actions are not subject to strict judicial
review and, until recently, television and radio consumers had no standing to
intervene in Commission licensing proceedings.124 Surely, however, when
Congress fails to legislate affirmative policy, that failure should not have a
substantive impact on Commission policy.
The most recent example of congressional policymaking in this vein followed WHDH, Inc.125 The FCC declined to renew the license of a Boston
119.

An example of the inequitable result of this statutory approach is found in Aladdin

Radio & Television, 10 P & F RADiO REG. 773 (1954). After a long and close comparative
proceeding between Aladdin, Inc. and Denver Television, a Denver TV license was awarded
to Aladdin on the basis of its broadcast experience (it owned AM and FM stations in
Denver) and local ownership (58% of Aladdin was locally owned, compared to Denver's
51%). The FCC did not think it relevant that Aladdin not only owned broadcast stations
in Denver, but also a number of other Colorado stations. Aladdin Radio & Television, Inc.,
9 P & F RADIO Rae. 1, 4-19. Barely four months after it had been awarded the license,
Aladdin applied to transfer its license to Time, Inc. Although Denver Television intervened,
under the provisions of the 1952 amendment it could not be compared, favorably or otherwise, with Time, Inc. Since the Commission found no evidence of fraud in the previous
proceeding, it awarded the license to Time, Inc. finding that it would not render service
inferior to that of Aladdin. 10 P & F RADIO REG. at 772-75.
120. See, e.g., Bryant, Regulation of Broadcast Networks, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 3, 43-44
(1970) (comprehensive list of bills introduced relating to network regulation, 1950-1969).
121. H.R. 2326, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
122. H.R. 6968 (84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
123. S. 2004, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). Not all bills favor the industry. See, e.g., H.R.
9486, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) (amendment to the Clayton Act to prohibit ownership by
one interest of substantial portions of broadcast and newspaper facilities in any one section
of the country).
124. See text accompanying notes 180-187 infra.
125. 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), noted in Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose" - The Aftermath
of WHDH in FCC License Renewal Policy, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1014 (1970); Jaffe, WHDH,
supra note 91; Tish, The Federal Communications Commission's License Renewal Policies A Turn of Events, Some Unanswered Questions, and a Pioposal, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 94 (1970);
Note, The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals: Perspectives on WHDH, 36 U. CHi. L.
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television station owned by the Herald-Traveller,one of the city's daily newspapers. The grounds for denial included mediocrity in programming,126 concentration of local media ownership, 27 and improprieties in the original
licensing process. 128 Although the opinion was not entirely clear, 129 and irregularities in WHDH's original licensing made the case unique, Senator
Pastore immediately filed legislation that would have prohibited FCC consideration of diversity and other criteria in license renewals.130 The bill was
never reported out of committee. Nevertheless, a year later the Commission,
influenced by the Senator's interest in the question, issued its Policy Statement
on Comparative Hearings on Renewal Applicants,'3 ' which declared that before competing applicants would be compared on relevant criteria, the incumbent's programming must be found "minimal" as opposed to "substantial." 3 2 The policy statement reached a result remarkably similar to that contemplated by Senator Pastore's bill.'133 One year later Citizens Communication
Center v. FCC134 held that not only was the policy statement contrary to the
hearing requirement established by Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 1 5 but that
the FCC was completely without statutory authority to adopt the policy.1 6
Congress is generally sensitive to property interests in commercial
broadcasting. 3 7 To the extent that diversity policy promises to threaten existing
broadcasting investments, the reaction of both Congress and the industry is
volatile.1 38 For this reason ownership rules are rarely retroactive, 3 9 and the
RLv. 854 (1969); Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protection of Mediocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 368 (1970).
126. 16 F.C.C. at 8-11.
127. Id. at 12-13.
128. Id. at 7-8.
129. As Representative Torbert Macdonald stated in opening hearings on License Renewal legislation, WHDH is "light years away from being a clear precedent." Hearings on
License Renewal, supra note 11, at 2.
130. S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
.131. 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).
132. Id. at 425-26.
133. In fact, the Commission took note of the bill in the policy statement. Id. at 424.
134. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
135. 326 U.S. 327 (1945) (articulating the requirement of a comparative proceeding
where there are two or more mutually exclusive applications).
136. 447 F.2d at 1211-12.
137. At odds in any renewal proceeding are the incumbent, with his substantial economic investment, and the applicant, who can only hold out the ephemeral promise of his
program proposals. Thus, it is understandable that in almost any comparative proceeding
the incumbent will be favored, even with only minimal performance over the-license period.
138. Cf. the industry reaction to WHDH: WHDH Decision Has Widespread, Costly
Implication-$3 Billion Down the Drain, BROAnCASTING, Feb. 3, 1969, at 19. Much of the
testimony at the License Renewal bill hearings centered around the effect of WHDH.' See,
e.g., Hearingson License Renewal, supra note 11, at 63-65, 162-64, 203-06.
139. For instance, when the Commission announced the multiple ownership rules in
1953 (limiting AM and FM licenses to seven each), it stated: "[W]e have concluded that any
proposal to limit multiple ownership on the basis of such factors as class of station or
geographical location, is either unsatisfactory or unworkable. For a formula, which we believe 'would reasonably limit ownership on such bases, would require extensive divestment
of holdings by licensees; it is felt that this would be unduly disruptive." Amendment of
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ownership status quo is maintained.140 This attitude does not comport with
either the Communications Act or with Supreme Court interpretations. By
statute, licenses are limited to a stated term of years and the "license shall not
vest in the licensee any rights to operate the station . . . beyond the term

thereof."141 As the Supreme Court stated in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station: "The policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have anything in
the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license.... Thus
the channels presently occupied remain free for a new assignment to another
licensee in the interest of the listening public."

142

License renewal legislation considered by the 93d Congress was substantively neutral concerning concentrated ownership. Section 2(b) of the House
bill would amend the Communications Act to permit FCC consideration of
licensees' ownership interests only where rules prohibiting specific ownership
interests have been adopted.14 A spokesman for the Justice Department testified at Senate hearings on the bill that Congress should either prohibit consideration of media ownership issues entirely, or in clear and certain terms
direct the Commission "to adopt rules requiring dissolution of existing local
media cross-ownership situations over a reasonable period of time."144 Instead,
the Senate decided to delete the provision entirely,14 on the assumption that
the FCC's longstanding construction of the Communications Act made it superflUOUS.

14 6

Justice Department
Until recently, the Justice Department was an infrequent participant in
FCC proceedings. Beginning in the late 1950's, the Antitrust Division went to
4

court to protest several mergers or acquisitions approved by the Commission.1

T

Multiple Ownership Rules, 18 Fed. Reg. 7796 (1953). See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
140. The Commission has given great weight to licensees' investments in the past, thus
giving preference to existing licensees over newcomers. See Wabash Valley Broadcasting
Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963); C. Bruce McConnell, 6 F.C.C. 167 (1938). Cf. South Florida
Television Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
141. 47 U.S.C. §309(h) (1970).
142. 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
143. H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §2 (1974).
144. Hearings on the Broadcast License Renewal Act Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93, pt. 1, at 134-35
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
145. See 120 CONG. REC. S18502-04 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974).
146. In defining "longstanding construction" of the Act, Senator Moss cited with approval Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951). 120 CONG. REc. S18503 (daily ed. Oct. 8,
1974). See note 32 supra.
147. In 1958 the Commission held hearings on the subject of network option time arrangements, made findings on the nature of option time, and transmitted its report to the
Justice Department for an opinion on its legality. Findings of Commission on Option Time,
18 P g- F RADIO RFc. 1809 (1959). Justice Department concluded that option time arrangements violated the Sherman Act as exclusive dealing or tying devices. Applicability of Antitrust laws to Option Time Practice, 18 P & F RADIO REc. 1801 (1959). Nevertheless, the FCC
determined that the practice could continue. Option Time Rules, 20 P & F RArno REG. 1568
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In 1956, for example, the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and Westinghouse Broadcasting Corp. proposed to exchange VHF stations in Philadelphia
and Cleveland. The FCC approved the transaction, notwithstanding evidence
of coercion on the part of the dominant party, RCA.-4 8 Subsequently, the
Justice Department filed an antitrust action charging RCA with a conspiracy
to acquire VHF stations in five of the country's eight largest markets.14 9 A
consent decree was entered 50 after the Supreme Court held that FCC approval did not immunize the transfer from separate antitrust attack.'l 5
Although it would seem that the Antitrust Division is an ideal advocate for
competition in the industry, its role is limited by its jurisdiction, prosecution
under antitrust laws, and the policy goals of current Administrations. The
first of these factors has been described by an attorney for the Justice Department:
While there is obvious social harm in a merger which removes a diverse
editorial voice from its community and from the nation, the Antitrust
Division must make an analysis which is essentially economic. In the
media business, as in all other businesses, if we cannot find a provable
economic effect in an identifiable
market, there is no action we can
5
take.., to prevent a merger.'
Thus, while the FCC can consider the deleterious first amendment effects of a
merger, the Antitrust Division is limited to the economic issues under the
Sherman or Clayton Acts. 153 It is ironic, then, that the Justice Department has
successfully fought mergers on antitrust grounds, which the FCC had already
approved as consistent with the public interest. In fact, it is anomalous that
the antitrust and regulatory approaches should conflict, since both the antitrust
laws and the Communications Act share the common purpose of assuring that
business serves the public interest. 5 4
The second limitation on the Justice Department is more subtle. The Antitrust Division cannot monitor all abuses in the commercial sector; because
(1960). Following an appeal supported by the Justice Department the Commission reconsidered and prohibited option time entirely. Television Option Time, 25 P & F RADio REG.
1651, 1686 (1963).
148. See Perry, CurrentAntitrust Problems in Broadcasting,27 Osno ST. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1966).
149. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 158 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
150. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 186 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
151. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
152. Mehaflte, Mergers and Diversification in the Newspaper, Broadcasting, and Information Industries,13 ANTrrgusr BULL. 927, 931 (1968).

153. Significantly, however, the Justice Department used a broader policy argument in
support of its petitions to deny the licenses of newspaper-owned stations in 1974: "[P]lainly,
[substantial cross-ownership] implies a . . . domination of the sources of local news and
opinion in a community of over a million and a half [St. Louis], a domination whose renewal cannot be said to be in the public interest." 1974 BNA ANTrraus-r & TRADE REG. REP.
No. 645, A-14.
154. One commentator suggests that antitrust issues should be tried in all licensing proceedings to avoid the waste of separate actions and duplication of effort. See Barrow, Antitrust and the Regulated Industry, Promoting Competition in Broadcasting, 1964 DuE L.J.
282, 283.
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manpower is limited, policy implementation is maximized by selective enforcement. 1",5 This problem is aggravated by the degree to which antitrust policy is
controlled by the White I-Iouse.1'5 Obviously, an Administration with close
ties to a particular area of business will not strictly enforce antitrust laws in
that area.'15 The Nixon Administration had few ties with the communications
industry, 1"8 and that has been suggested as a reason for recent Antitrust Division activity in that field. 159 Justice's involvement has centered around newspaper-broadcasting cross-ownership, as in 1969 when the owner of KFDM-TV
in Beaumont, Texas proposed to transfer his license to the owner of Beaumont's only daily newspaper. 60° The Justice Department intervened and protested on antitrust grounds.' 6' The FCC scheduled a hearing on the pro63
posal, 6 2 and the parties involved withdrew their application.
In 1973-1974 Justice filed objections with the FCC against the license re64
newals of five newspaper publishers who held local broadcast properties.
Each case involved common ownership of a newspaper or television station, or
both, within the same city.165 Apparently Justice's interventions were motivated

155. This fact is shown by the few antitrust proceedings instituted by the Justice Department each year. For instance, during the years 1965-1969, the Department filed only 195
antitrust actions, an average of 39 per year. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 365, 366, table 1 (1970).
156. Legislation was introduced in the 93d Congress to create an independent Justice
Department. See Hearings on Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice Before
the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95d Cong., 2d
Sess. at 249-81 (1974).
157. One of the reasons for the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) was
because "[tjhe actual enforcement of the [Sherman Act] did not inspire public confidence
either in the adequacy of the law or in the zeal of the Attorney General in prosecuting
those who violated it." P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 24-25 (1967).
158. See Whiteside, Annals of Television, THE NEw YORKER, March 17, 1975, at 41 (Nixon
Administration and television); cf. Hearings on License Renewal, supra note 11, at 301-02
(remarks of Rep. Macdonald); id. pt. 2, at 809-14 (testimony of Clay Whitehead); Addresses
by then-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew to the Iowa Republicans in Des Moines, Iowa, Nov.
19, 1969, and to the Chamber of Commerce in Montgomery, Alabama, Nov. 20, 1969, in
M. EMERY & T. SIMYTHE, supra note 2, at 309, 346.
159. But see 1974 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 654, A-13 (remarks of Ass't
Att'y Gen. Bruce Wilson). Wilson defended the Justice Department against charges that its
policy was being used for political purposes. His position is supported by the fact that the
White House Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) supported the five-year proposal
and other provisions favorable to the industry, at the same time that the Justice Department
was pressuring the FCC to adopt rules restricting cross-ownership. The relationship of the
OTP to the Commission is discussed in Barrow, OTP and FCC: Role of the Presidency and
the Independent Agency in Communications, 43 U. CIN. L .REv. 291 (1974).
160. See Beaumont Broadcasting Corp., 13 F.G.C.2d 989 (1968).

161.

1968 BNA ANTITRUST

& TRADE REG. REP. No.

357, A-12.

162. Beaumont Broadcasting Corp., 13 F.C.C.2d 989 (1968).
163. See Beaumont Television Corp., 17 F.C.C.2d 577, 581 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
KFDM was subsequently transferred to the owner of even greater media interests than those
of the originally proposed transferee, though not in the Beaumont area. Id. at 579-82.
164. See 1974 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE Rac. REP. No. 645, A-14.
165. 1974 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 662, A-Il; see Senate Hearings, supra
note 144, at 126-27 (testimony of Bruce Wilson, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Justice Department).
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by the FCC's reluctance to proceed with the enlarged issues proposed in Docket
No. 18110 by the 1970 Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking366 Following
Justice's renewal interventions in March 1974, the Commission reactivated the
rulemaking, narrowing the scope of its inquiry to the question of co-located
167
newspaper and VHF television ownership.
The Justice .Department's objections to license renewals might have done
more than revive the rulemaking in Docket No. 18110. Its actions were cited
in the House debate on H.R. 12998 as further evidence of the need for stability in te license renewal process.' 08 The House bill would have amended
section 307(d) of the Communications Act to prohibit, in a license renewal
proceeding,. FCC consideration of a licensee's ownership interests in "other
stations or other communications media or other businesses," unless the FCC
had adopted rules prohibiting such ownership and given the licensee an opportunity to comply.169 Stated differently, under this amendment there would
be no consideration of local media concentration in individual cases unless the
FCC .had first adopted a general rule. The rationale for this provision, as
stated in the Committee Report, was that to consider concentrated ownership
on a case-by-case basis "would result in restructuring the broadcast industry in
a haphazard, subjective, and oft-times inconsistent manner which ... would
10
be unfair and undesirable."'
Were this the sole purpose of the amendment, it would not even be necessary. The Commission has stated- that it does not intend to "restructure" the
industry through the renewal process.' 7' in a license proceeding, a party raising a concentration of control issue must allege specific abuses resulting from
2
ownership structure to be granted a hearing on the issueY.7
In Hale v. FCC173
the court affirmed this strict approach, partly because of the Commission's
ongoing rulemaking in Docket No. 18110.174 The House Bill would have
166. 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970). See notes 81-89 supra and accompanying text.
167. Memorandum Report and Order, Docket No. 18110, F.C.C. 74-222 (March 7, 1974).

See Senate Hearings,supra note 144, at 126-27.
168.
169.

120 CoNG. Ric. H3414 (daily ed. May 1, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Staggers).
H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §2(b) (1974). The legislative history of the bill

indicates that Congress does not disapprove of FCC rulemaking'limiting cross-media ownership. The Committee Report, for instance, merely states that the Commission should take

whatever action in Docket No. 18110 it deems appropriate, without jurisdictional limitations.
Since the new cross-ownership rules specifically prohibit newspaper and broadcasting crossownership, see text accompanying notes 81-89 supra, the legislation would render moot the
decision in Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1942), that the FCC has no authority
under the Communications Act to make' a rule prohibiting newspaper ownership of radio

stations because the FCC has no jurisdiction over newspapers. The events leading up to
Stahlman are described in Toohey, Newspaper Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 20 FED.
Cosmm. B.J. 44, 47-50 (1966).
170. H.R. rP. No. 961, 93d Cong., 2d Sas. 19 (1974).171., See Senate Hearings,supra note 144, at 87-88 (testimony of FCC Chairman Richard
Wiley); Hearings on License Renewal, sltpra note 11, at 62-63 (former FCC Chairman Dean
Burch).

172.

-

Midwest Radio-Television, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 943, 17 F.C.C.2d 290 (1969); Chronicle,

Broadcasting Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 882, 17 F.C.C.2d 245 (1969).

-

173. 425 F.2d 556 (D.C.Cir. 1970).
174. Id. at 560; accord, Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 330-31 (IY.C. Cif. 1972) .
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eliminated even this strict approach in license renewals unless the licensee
were in violation of multiple ownership rules.
The Senate Commerce Committee deleted this provision on the ground that
the Commission has never considered ownership affiliations per se to disqualify
a licensee, and thus the amendment would be superfluous.175 The Committee
made clear its intent that it favored the narrow approach to consideration of
176
ownership interests in the licensing process represented by Hearst Radio, Inc.
The problem with the policy favored by the House and Senate is that it would
preclude FCC consideration of concentrated ownership even where a licensee's
control would otherwise amount to a violation of the antitrust laws. In such a
case the Justice Department would be limited to court action, because even a
clear demonstration of unlawful concentration in an individual market is not
177
a "specific abuse" within the meaning of FCC policy.
A second drawback to the current congressional attitude is that it would
discourage FCC consideration of any ownership interests. The rulemaking in
Docket No. 18110 dealt only with newspaper ownership of broadcast facilities.
Other significant ownership relations - for example, conglomerate ownership
of licensed facilities- could not be weighed by the FCC in renewal proceedings. Thus, if the Commission does not adopt rules regarding ownership
structure, 178 and such issues cannot be raised in individual proceedings, they
will not be raised at all. The fate of Justice Department, and to some extent
private party, participation in FCC proceedings involving ownership interests
hangs in the balance.
Citizens' Groups
In 1916 Elihu Root, then President of the American Bar Association,
stated: "If we are to continue a government of limited powers, agencies of
regulation must themselves be regulated. .

.

. The rights of citizens against

them must be made plain. ' ' 179 It is surprising that members and representatives
of a broadcast station's audience - the most numerous consumers of the station's "product" - were not accorded standing to protest license renewals until
the 1966 decision of Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ
v. FCC.' s°
The standing issue revolves around whether the objecting party is a "party

175. 120 CONG. REC. S18502-04 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974).
176. 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
177. Such an approach would contradict the philosophy of Gulf States Util. v. FPC, 411
U.S. 747 (1973). In holding that the FPC is required to consider antitrust issues under the
public interest standard of the Federal Power Act, the Court stated: "Consideration of antitrust and anticompetitive issues by the Commission, moreover, serves the important function of establishing a first line of defense against those competitive practices that might later
be the subject of antitrust proceedings." Id. at 760. See text accompanying notes 213-217
infra.
178. See note 115 supra.
179. 41 A.B.A. REP. 355, 368-69 (1916).
180. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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in interest. '181 Much litigation has centered around standing in the FCC con1 2
text, because while anyone can file informal objections to action on a license,"
only a party in interest can demand a hearing and participate as a matter of
right.18 3 Prior to Church of Christ, almost anyone who could allege economic
injury enjoyed standing. 8 4 This group was generally limited to other broadcasters and newspaper owners.
In Church of Christ, members and representatives of WLBT-TV's viewing
audience in Jackson, Mississippi protested the renewal of WLBT's license because it had failed to operate in the public interest. The protest was primarily
aimed at the station's discriminatory programming. 8 5 Although the FCC issued stern warnings to WLBT, it found a need for continued broadcast service,
renewed the license without a hearing, and dismissed the petition to intervene. 8 6 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
an evidentiary hearing was required under the circumstances revealed by the
record. The court observed that "a history of programming misconduct of the
kind alleged would preclude, as a mater of law, the required finding that re8
newal of the license would serve the public interest."' '7
Church of Christ has enhanced the potential for citizen participation in
the licensing process, as shown by the proliferation of petitions to deny filed
against renewal applicants.'
There is evidence that the FCC treats citizen

181. 47 U.S.C. §309(d)(1) (1970) provides in part: "Any party in interest may file with
the Commission a petition to deny any application ...
182. See 47 C.F.R. §1.587 (1973).
183. Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Elm
City Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
184. See, e.g., Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (newspaper faced with loss of revenue from advertising); Greenville Television Co. v. FCC, 221
F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (loss of expected advertising revenues to noninterfering station);
Metropolitan Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (loss of audience
beyond normally protected contours).
185. The specific claims were that the station had violated the fairness doctrine by
denying equal time to WLBT's critics, violated the fairness doctrine by not providing for
the dissemination of opposing views on racial issues, discriminated against local black
citizens by not giving them adequate exposure, though almost half of the station audience
was black, similarly discriminated against the Catholic Church, and devoted a disproportionate
amount of time to entertainment and commercials. 359 F.2d at 994, 997-99.
186. See Lamar Broadcasting Corp., 1 F.C.C.2d 1482 (1965).
187. 359 F.2d at 1007. In a second decision following the FCC's remanded treatment of
the renewal proceedings, Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425
F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Church of Christ II), the court held that the Commission had
placed an unreasonable burden of proof upon the intervenors, which reflected a "curious
neutrality in favor of the licensee." The court stated that providing a forum for the expression of public views is not enough: the FCC has "an affirmative duty to assist in the
development of a meaningful record which can serve as the basis for the evaluation of the
licensee's performance of his duty to serve the public interest." Id. at 548. See Volner, Broadcast Regulation: Is There Too Much "Public" in the "Public Interest"?, 43 U. CN. L. Ra,.
267, 272-75 (1974) (analysis of Church of Christ I & 11).

188.

Petitions to deny filed against applicants for renewal of broadcast licenses:
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interventions as gratuitous harassment, 189 but as the Commission indicated in
Midwest Radio-Television, Inc. (WCCO) 90 and Chronicle Broadcasting Co.
(KRON-FM),191 well-drafted objections to a licensee's ownership qualifications
will at least result in an inquiry into specific abuses resulting from alleged
concentrated ownership. Church of Christ thus permits the infusion of social
rather than purely economic or mechanical perspectives into the licensing
192

process.
The standing allowance to citizens' and public interest groups has had an

impact on ownership diversity, especially in the transfer area. In 1969, for
instance, the owners of WFMT-FM (Chicago) applied to transfer the station
to WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
1 93
The ad hoc Citizens Committee To Save WFMT interChicago Tribune.
vened on the concentration of control issue,19 and a hearing was scheduled.
Following the intervention, WFMT amended its transfer application to pro-

pose transfer not to Continental, but to the nonprofit Chicago Educational
Television Association.

9

When the Citizens Committee approved, the FCC

98

granted the transfer.
Congress is apparently uneasy about the increased number of petitions to

Fiscal Year

No. of Stations Filed Against

No. of Petitions

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

2
3
2
15
38
68
50

2
3
2
16
84
103
150

H.R.

REP.

No. 961, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974).

189. In Church of Christ II the court stated: "The record now before us leaves us with
a profound concern over the entire handling of this case .... The impatience with the
Public Intervenors, the hostility toward their efforts to satisfy a surprisingly strict burden of
proof, plain errors in rulings and findings lead us . . . to the conclusion that [the] administrative conduct reflected in this record is beyond repair." 425 F.2d at 550. See also Hearings
on License Renewal, supra note 11, at 132 (testimony of FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson); M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, supra note 7, at 112 (petition to deny raising serious questions
about incumbent's programming rejected because a letter was not on "double-spaced typewritten pages").
190. 16 F.C.C.2d 943 (1969).
191. 16 F.C.C.2d 882 (1969).
192. 359 F.2d at 1002-04. See generally Note, Standing of Television Viewers To Contest
FCC Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1511 (1966). But see Volner,
supra note 187 (critical of "public interest" approach to broadcast regulation).
193. An account of the procedure employed by the Committee appears in Bennett, Media
Concentration and the FCC: Focusing with a Section Seven Lens, 66 Nw. L. REV. 159, 166-69
(1971).
194. Gale Broadcasting Co., 17 F.C.C.2d 391 (1969).
195. Gale Broadcasting Co., 20 F.C.C.2d 924 (1969).
196. Gale Broadcasting Co., 21 F.C.C.2d 401 (1969).
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deny filed by community groups. 10 7 The House License Renewal bill proposed
to limit their impact with two provisions. The bill would amend the Communications Act to require the FCC to abide by strict time limits within which
petitions to deny may be filed. 198 Although the present Act does not prescribe
time limits, FCC rules allow ten days for petitions to deny to be filed in opposition to applications for transfer or renewal. 99 Petitions to intervene must
be filed within thirty days. 200 The bill denies the FCC the discretion to allow
late interventions, however compelling the reason. The effect will be to blunt
the attack of many citizens' interventions because the complex issues involved
require time to prepare,20 ' and the notice provisions prescribed by FCC rules
are in most cases inadequate to inform local audiences of proposed action concerning their stations.202 The Justice Department itself claimed lack of notice
when it intervened beyond the deadline in the ABC-ITT merger:.
.
A second amendment proposed.by H.R. 12993 to some extent mitigates the
harshness of the compulsory deadline by encouraging broadcast licensees to
respond to- community complaints. Section 4 of the House bill would require
the .Commission to prescribe proceduresby which ".persons raising significant
issues regarding the. operations of [local .broadcast] stations" may .enter "negotiations" with such stations to resolve complaints.203 .-. -----The Senate approached citizen.participation .inthe xenewal process in a
subtler manner. The Senate version would.have required licensees to ascertain
community needs and views -throughout the license term, .rather than just
before renewal as in current practice. 20 4 At renewal time, if the licensee had
properly conducted the ascertainment and met the problems, needs, and interests thus discovered, a presumption in favor of renewal .would.be established if
there were_ no other serious deficiencies in station, operation. 205 Debate on the
effect of the presumption centered on the comparative renewal -context, without mentioning the effect on petitions to. deny.20 r Clearly, however, if -the
licensee has met the bill's requirements and thus gains a presumption, the
intervenor will have a heavy burden in.showing that the licensee is unfit for
renewaL. Objections to renewal in the-first instance will no doubt be, limited
-19.
Cf. 120 CONG. REc. H3415 (daily'ed -May 1. 1974) (remarks of Rep. Dorn).
198. Section 3 of the bill provides: "Any party iii interest may file With the Commission,
within such time limits -as may be prescribed by the .rules of the Commission, a petition to
deny applications to which subsection (b) [47 U.S.C. §309(b)] applies." H.R. 12993, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. §3 (1974). The statute in its present form does not mandate strict time limits. See
47 U.S.C. §309(d)(1) (1970).
199. 47 C.F.R. §§1.45 (opposition to transfers must be filed within 10 days), 1.223 (oppositions to renewal must be filed within 30 days) (1973).
200. Id
201. See, for example, the complex analysis suggested in Bennett, supra note 193, at

173-79.
202. See 47 C.F.R. §§1.580, .594 (1973).
-203. H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §4 (1974).
204. H.R. 12993, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §2(a) (Senate substitute 1974).
205. Id. §2(b).
206. See 120 CoNG. REc. S18500-01 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974). The Committee did not reveal
the exact nature of the presumption, except that it would be a "plus of major significance."
Id. at S18500.
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to the categories established by the bill - that is, whether the licensee's ascertainment is an accurate reflection of community views.
The apparent philosophy of both versions of license renewal legislation is
to minimize the jeopardy to broadcast licenses, which are formally challenged
at renewal time, while providing a forum for local groups with good faith
complaints.2 °7 The House bill would resolve these complaints by requiring
"negotiations" between the licensee and the complainants; the Senate bill assumes that complaints will be discovered, and deficiencies remedied, during the
licensee's ongoing ascertainment of community problems and views. The House
approach is more desirable from the standpoint of consumer participation, for
the Senate formula could virtually foreclose consideration of issues unrelated
to the ascertainment procedure. Even so, there are drawbacks to the House
bill: the "negotiations" provision has no penalties for a station's refusal to
enter negotiations, nor does it specify which issues are worthy of resolution. 20 8
The Committee Report on H.R. 12993 states the rationale for the "negotiations" provision: "It is in the interest of all to avoid disruptive confrontations
and, whenever possible, the time, expense, and acrimony which result from
the filing of a petition to deny against a broadcast station if the issue can be
9
more efficiently resolved."2
It should be pointed out that petitions to deny usually result from the
frustration that local groups encounter in trying to get broadcasters to amend
their program standards.210 When the station owner is not a local resident, or
the station is chain-owned (or conglomerate owned), the conflict becomes more
acute, as absentee owners are apt to be less responsive to the community.
The bills considered in the last session, and legislation currently before
Congress, are responses to the increase in citizen activism spawned by Church
of Christ. In the diversity context, both bills would to some degree preclude
consideration of ownership interests in the renewal process. As to station
transfers, it is apparent that the approach taken by the House bill would require increased sophistication on the parts of local citizens or public interest
groups to have any effect on preventing concentrated ownership through
merger or acquisition. The bill's stringent limitations on periods during which
to petition or intervene would require monitoring of licensees' proposals in
order that the time allotted for preparations of the groups' objections may be
maximized. An ad hoc approach to citizen intervention would not be possible
under the House legislation.
The Judiciary
One commentator has noted that "Delegation of regulatory power to ad207. See H.R. REP. No. 961, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-16, 20-21 (1974); 120 CONG. Rzc.
S18500 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Pastore).
208. It would remain for the FCC to define the nature of these provisions. Because the
Commission's ascertainment standards have evolved through case law, the probable result
will be adoption of general policy into specific rules. See, e.g., Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1901 (1965).
209. H.R. REP. No. 961, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974).
210. See, e.g., Lamar Broadcasting Corp., 1 F.C.C.2d 1482 (1965).
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ministrative agencies with little more guidance than 'public interest' comes
perilously close to abdication of legislative functions and helps to set the stage
"..."211
The same author urged that, since Congress
for judicial abdication .
had indicated a general desire that competition in the business sector be
maximized, courts should adopt a general rule of law that an agency cannot
act where the effect will be to lessen competition except where the objectives of
the agency's enabling statute cannot otherwise be met.212 The rule would be
enforced by judicial review of agency action.
In 1943 in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 21 3 the Supreme
Court upheld a Commission rule designed to regulate chain broadcasting "in
2
the light of the purposes which the Sherman Act was designed to achieve." 14
Since that time, courts have held in several instances that a legislative "public
interest" standard not only permits but requires a regulatory agency to consider antitrust issues in relevant proceedings.215 Typical is Gulf States Utilities
Co. v. FPC, 216 in which the Supreme Court interpreted the "public interest"
standard of section 204 of the Federal Power Act to require the FPC to consider antitrust issues in section 204 proceedings, despite the FPC's contrary
interpretation and practice of many years' standing.2-7 In many of these cases
the antitrust issues were raised by intervenors, who appealed agency refusals
to consider their complaints.
The judiciary has not had so dramatic an impact on the FCC in the antitrust context, primarily because local citizens did not have standing to raise
such issues until Church of Christ. Thus, for many years the only parties who
appealed FCC overtures in limiting ownership or control were broadcasters.
Of course, the courts have almost unanimously affirmed Commission rules encouraging diversity; but courts cannot write rules for the FCC, and must be
content with dicta announcing what the Commission could do under the Com21 8
munications Act, if it were so inclined.
Jurisdiction over appeals from FCC decisions in license proceedings is currently vested exclusively in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.219
The House license renewal bill proposed to allow appeals in these cases only
to the court of appeals for the circuit in which the broadcast station is located. 220 The reasons given for this provision were the extraordinary length of
211. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 475.
212. Id. at 464.
213. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
214. Id. at 223.
215. E.g., FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 242-46 (1968); Denver &
R.G.W.R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 492-98 (1967); United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577, 585 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Municipal Elec. Ass'n v. SEC, 413 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
216. 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
217. Id. at 757.
218. E.g., United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351-52 (1959) (FCC
could deny a license on antitrust principles) (dictum). See Hearings on License Renewal,
supra note 11, at 66-67 (discussion of dicta in Citizens Communications Center).
219. 47 U.S.C. §402(b) (1970).
220. H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §5 (1974). The Senate substitute deleted this provision.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/8

26

Watkins: Diversity Ownership in Broadcasting: Affirmative Policy in Search
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

time taken for disposition of appeals in the D.C. Circuit,221 and the savings
involved for local parties who will not have to travel to Washington to prosecute their appeals. 222 More important would be the effect of the amendment on
the jurisprudence of the Communications Act. The lodging of appellate jurisdiction in other circuit courts will inevitably result in conflicts, as the courts
balance competing policy rationales. This, in turn, will generate more adjudication at the Supreme Court level.22s Ultimately, the judicial impact on
the communications industry may thus be enhanced.
CONCLUSION

Regulation of broadcasting creates a basic tension between the freedom of
broadcasters and the right of the public to be informed. Exploring this tension, the Supreme Court concluded in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and
their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers
224
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
The Commission can approach regulation on behalf of "viewers and listeners"
in the first amendment context in two ways. As discussed in this note, the FCC
can encourage diverse ownership to insure that as many different persons as
possible participate in broadcasting. Such diversity would also foreclose domination in one market by a single party. The second approach involves limited
regulation of program content through the fairness doctrine. 225 The doctrine
requires the presentation of a wide variety of "controversial issues of public
27
importance"226 and responsible conflicting views.2
As recently construed in National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (Pensions
case), 228 the fairness doctrine allows broadcasters a wide latitude in determining whether controversial issues of public importance, worthy of the presentation of opposing or contrasting points of view, are involved in a program. The
FCC, said the court, can only intervene where the licensee has abused its
journalistic discretion or acted in bad faith, and the burden of proving these is
221. The median time of disposition of appeals in the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit is 11.7 months, the longest of any court of appeals in the country. H.R. REP. No.
961, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1974).
222. Id.
223. See Senate Hearings,supra note 144, at 85-86.
224. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
225. The Fairness Doctrine had its genesis in Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13
F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Congress gave statutory recognition to the doctrine with a 1959 amendment to the Communications Act. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, §1, 73 Stat. 557,
amending 47 U.S.C. §315(a) (1970). See note 24 supra. The Commission's present views on
the fairness doctrine are expressed in Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards: Fairness Report Regarding Handling of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26372 (1974).
226. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
227. Id.
228.
F.2d
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
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substantial.229 The Pensions case reflects the current judicial trend of reaffirming the editorial independence of newspapers and broadcasters from governs0
mental restrictions in any form.2
The limitation imposed on the fairness doctrine seems well justified. For
one thing, it is questionable whether the doctrine has served or impeded a
"robust" exchange of ideas. Many broadcasters have no doubt believed that
controversial programming would endanger their licenses. 231 More important,
however, is the erosion of the "limited airwaves" rationale for programming
regulation as technology develops the means for more access to both broadcasting and reception.232 Gable television holds enormous promise in this context.2-3 3 The result of such a technologically-induced increase in channels
should be a concomitant relaxation of programming regulation.
As the fairness doctrine becomes a less useful means of encouraging pro23 4
gram diversity, the need to enforce diverse ownership becomes imperative,
for only by encouraging competition can the Commission promote the free and
uncontrolled dissemination of ideas. The FCC has been unwilling to develop a
meaningful affirmative ownership policy, and the regulatory process is becom229. Id. at
230. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (states may not impose
strict liability nor assess punitive damages in libel actions); Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) ("right to reply" law unconstitutionally intrudes into function of newspaper editors); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcast
licensees may impose blanket ban on all editorial advertising); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v.
FCC, 460 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972) (licensee did not abuse
discretion in interpreting fairness doctrine obligations generated by radio and TV address by
President).
231. Creative programming has gotten some licensees into trouble at renewal time. See,
e.g., Eastern Education Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 400 (1970); Jack Straw Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d
833 (1970).
232. See Note, The Fairness Doctrine: Time for the Graveyard?, 2 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
563 (1974).
233.

See, e.g., CABINET Coa mrrrEE ON CABLE COUMMUNCATIONS, CABLE: REPORT TO THE
34-37 (1974); Foundation '70, A Cable Is a Very Big Wire, 2 YALE REv. L. & Soc.
AcrIoN 199 (1972); Freebairn, Public Access in New York City: An Interview with Theodora
PRESmENT

Sklover, 2 YALE REV. L. &-Soc. AGFnoN 227 (1972); Lapierre, Cable Television and the
Promise of Programming Diversity, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 25 (1973); Note, Cable Television
for Florida:Plan or Chaos?,26 U. FLA. L. Rav. 236, 237-38 (1974).
234. This was the unanimous conclusion of the WARREN CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
59. The conferees' recommendations included the following: "In view of the wide spectrum of
radio frequencies now available throughout the nation for the expression of a divergency of
views, the Federal Communications Act should be amended to remove from the Federal
Communications Commission the power to regulate the program content of radio stations....
The Federal Communications Commission should suspend, on an experimental basis, program content regulation of television in limited geographical market areas if total deregulation of television content cannot be had." Id. at 21-22.
To balance the proposed deregulation, the Conference also recommended: "In order to
maximize the diversity of free expression, government should use its anti-monopoly powers
to oppose the concentration of medio ownership within all identifiable geographical market
areas. This includes taking steps not only to prevent concentration, but to more affirmatively
reduce existing concentration of ownership." Id. at 23.
There is at least one notable dissent from this approach. See generally Barron, An
Emerging Right of Access to the Media., 37 GEo. WASH, L. Rax. 487 (1969).
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ing harder to penetrate for interest groups hoping to affect policy. Nevertheless, the Commission retains the authority to define a consistent diversity policy. The "public interest, convenience, and necessity" should compel it to do
no less.
McNEILL WATKINS,
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